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ABSTRACT
Children at ages 4 and 7 were presented three
stories, one in each of three causality versions, in order
to determine whether inference ability and recall are
influenced by the strength of the causal chain in the
story. For each story, children were asked two inference
questions about logical causality, two questions
constrained by story information, and two unconstrained
inference questions. Three question-timing conditions
were used to address issues concerning when inferences
are drawn in story comprehension and how they are
influenced by the total amount of information provided.
Questions were asked either on-line, or at the end of the
story, or not at all. Following completion of each story,
children were asked to retell it, and were then asked
premise information questions.
Four-year olds' story comprehension ability and
recall were enhanced when provided physical causlity
information, while 7-year olds' comprehension and recall
were unaffected by causality version. Younger children
also benefitted from additional story material, while
older chidren did not. Finally, developmental changes in
patterns of usage of logical, constrained, and
unconstrained inferences were evident.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The main goal of this research was to specify some
elements in the progress of comprehension and recall of
stories during development. Major advances in our
understanding of text comprehension have been made in
recent years, with theoretical accounts of comprehension
only very recently converging toward a unified model.
This research attempted to delineate the process of
inference-making abilities, and thus, to contribute to
this developing model. Before explication of the
experimental paradigm utilized here, some of the major
approaches to understanding text which influenced it will
be reviewed.
Background
S tor y gxa.mma.r_s.. Several accounts have attempted to
characterize the critical importance of the structure of
stories (e.g., Johnson & Mandler, 1980; Kintsch, 1977;
Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1975; Stein & Glenn,
1979; Thorndyke, 1977). The major assumption in all of
these attempts is that stories have a canonical structure,
and that people use their implicit knowledge of this
structure to guide comprehension and recall. The
1
2knowledge of story structure is generally considered to
exist as a schema, consisting of expectations concerning
elements to be found and relations that will hold between
elements (Johnson & Mandler, 1980). it may also serve
as a code at the time of retrieval, with individuals
having a set of ordered categories, independent of story
content, at their disposal (Mandler, 1978). Mandler
(1978) points to three primary functions of a schema.
First, it directs attention to a general area of memory,
which indicates to the reader the type of information
which is to be retrieved; second, it provides a temporal
sequence to find specific content; third, the schema
allows the individual to generate an approximation, if the
exact content cannot be retrieved.
Detailed analyses of story structure follow from the
analysis by Rumelhart (1975) of the story structure as
grammar, with the representation of the story comprised of
syntactic and semantic components involving the
categorization of events and the causal relations between
categories. Many investigators (e.g., Johnson & Mandler,
1980; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Stein & Glenn, 1979;
Thorndyke, 1977) have argued that "rewrite rules" contain
knowledge about the generic structure of stories; and the
schema which is implicit in these rules (or grammars) is
used in a top-down fashion to encode a story in chunks
3corresponding to the rules and to generate expectancies
about the nature of the story structure. In Johnson &
Mandler"s (1980) grammar, the important components of this
argument may be seen. In general, a hierarchical network
of story categories and the logical relationships
connecting the categories is used. The episode is the
basic unit of analysis, containing two elaborative
branches. Each of these branches perform different
functions—either allowing the development of the story,
or setting the stage for multi-episode stories. In both
cases however, the episode forms the initiating elements
of the story. The hierarchical network continues with the
beginning followed by developm ent . where goals of the
protagonist may be seen, or some action may take place.
Depending on the sequence in the development stage, either
a goal path (following the former sequence), or a reaction
(following the latter sequence), may be instantiated. One
of these paths will then result in an outcome , signifying
whether or not the protagonist attained the goal. The
final category, the ending., represents long-range
consequences of the development stage, or responses by
story characters to that stage.
In recent years, a good deal of support for this type
of analysis has been established. One avenue of research
4has focused on stories whose structure violates the
canonical structure described in the grammar; while a
second has looked at patterns of category emergence in
both recall tasks and importance (to story) ratings (e.g.,
Mandler, 1978; Mandler & DeForest, 1979; Mandler &
Johnson, 1977; Stein & Glenn, 1979; Stein & Nezworski,
1978). Mandler & Johnson (1977), for example,
presented first-graders, fourth-graders, and adults with
tape-recorded stories and found recall varied
significantly with age, but pointed to the finding that
there was a similar ordering among categories in recall
(setting, beginning, outcome, etc.) in the three age
groups. Mandler & Johnson conclude from this that while
complexity and elaborations may become richer with
development, even the youngest subjects are sensitive to
the underlying structure of stories and use this schema to
organize their retrieval. Mandler & DeForest (1978)
presented third-graders, sixth-graders, and adults with
stories in either a canonical or an interleaved format.
The finding that younger children recalled the story in
canonical form, regardless of the condition they were in,
led Mandler & DeForest to claim that not only can young
children use the story schema to guide their retrieval— it
appears as though it is the preferred mode of
organization. In general, much of the work on story
5grammar representation indicates that it may serve as a
guide to understanding the processing which must take
place in the comprehension of a story, and how
expectancies within stories are developed.
While the schema concept is widely employed, there
does exist some disagreement concerning the level at which
expectancies are generated. Kintsch (1977), for example,
provides only a global description of structural elements
within a story, without emphasizing the incorporation of
prior expectancies that a reader might have about the
organization of a particular story. Instead, his model
has emphasized the analysis of the structure of text
propositions, and relations between propositions. Kintsch
argues that while story structure does seem to be an
important characteristic in an analysis of story
comprehension, the segmentation of text into categories is
done through a strategy based on cues in the text, rather
than through a rule-based analysis of the story structure.
The global interpretation of the role of story
grammar representation as made by Mandler and her co-
workers has not gone without empirical challenge as well.
McClure, Mason, & Barnitz (1978) used a scrambled story
technique in order to examine the role of surface text
features as well as the underlying story schema. Using
third-graders, sixth-graders, and ninth-graders, three
versions of each of six stories were used to monitor the
effects of beginning a story with the setting (which most
closely approximated a story grammar structure), with a
question, or with a conclusion. While the findings of
this study are similar in some respects to those of
Mandler & DeForest (1977), in that young children seem
more dependent on "normal" structure than older children,
they also found evidence that in some cases, surface cues
also have an effect on story sequencing. While McClure,
et al., confined their discussion of surface cues to a
brief mention of "salient lexical ties" and "specific
lexical items", other studies have attempted a more
specific delineation of factors which may operate in the
comprehension of stories. Frederikson (1977), in a
summary of research which has been conducted with
"degraded" stories (scrambled order, deletions), points to
this problem. He suggests the necessity of being aware of
alternative explanations for many of the results obtained,
including the use of text-based cues and text-based
inferences which may generate coherence in a narrative as
well as in recall protocols. In other words, a set of
important concerns remain centered on whether text-based
components of these story grammar categories need to be
identified in order to understand how the grammar
7operates, and how the developing process of comprehension
skills proceeds.
£c_jice_p_£ua.l s_cJie_ma.s_. Most of the research in this
direction may be traced to the influence of the work of
Schank & Abelson (1977). Their examination of research
from a wide diversity of disciplines (including
linguistics and artificial intelligence) suggested two
major points which can be seen developing in current
thinking about story comprehension. First, they assert
that widespread agreement has been developing that
semantic features are considerably more important than had
previously been believed; and second, the role of context
has come to be seen as overwhelmingly important in the
interpretation of text. The implications of these two
factors for text comprehension is that while text content
guides the process of understanding, important components
to understanding are located outside the text itself
—
primarily in the knowledge of actions and causality which
the reader or listener brings to the task. This type of
mental representation is defined by Schank & Abelson
(1977) as a script, which they argue functions in the
interpretation of stories and aids in the prediction of
likely sequences of events. Nelson, Fivush, Hudson, &
Lucariello (1982) have also argued that the scriptal
8organization points to temporal and causal relations
between components of narratives, with a particular
sequential structure of events called for in a given
context. Relations between details in the narrative are
considered optional in this scheme with the only
constraint being that they are described in a manner
logically consistent with the broad structure. Major
support for these claims comes from work with adult
subjects (e.g., Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979) in which it
has been found that there is often confusion of actions
which are implied by the scriptal organization of stories
with stated actions. Scriptal knowledge and use of
scripts in story recall with chilren has been examined by
Nelson and her co-workers (e.g., McCartney & Nelson, 1981;
Nelson, 1979; Nelson, Fivush, Hudson, & Lucariello, 1982;
Nelson & Gruendal, 1981). In general, it has been found
that young children's knowledge about routine events fits
the script model, with a great deal of commonality among
reports, and reliable sequencing of actions between
children (Nelson, 1979; Nelson & Gruendel, 1981). The use
of scripts in story recall has also been promising.
McCartney & Nelson (1981) found that young children's
recall of stories was influenced by event knowledge
sequences as opposed to state knowledge. They also found
that changes in the story during recall reflected the fact
9that detail information is not as tightly constrained as
event sequencing, and that logically consistent changes
were the predominant type of changes made.
According to Schank (1977) the representation of text
in memory, which exists as a sequence of causally
connected actions and states, is described by conceptual
dependency th e o ry. This theory describes conceptually
primitive elements representing specific classes of
actions and states in such a way as to ensure that
sentences which differ in language but are identical in
meaning have only one representation, and that information
which is implicit in the text will be explicit in the
representation of the text in memory. This view, that the
text will be decomposed into underlying states or actions,
and that representation of text is influenced by the
unfolding of a chain of events over time has recently been
the focus of many researchers. More specifically, the
causal connections between states and actions has been the
primary point of emphasis, with the study of the
inferential process assuming an increasingly important
role (e.g., Graesser, Robertson, & Anderson, 1981;
Omanson, in press; Omanson, Warren, & Trabasso, 1978;
Trabasso, Secco, & van der Broek, 1983; Trabasso &
Nicholas, 1981; Warren, Nicholas,' & Trabasso, 1979).
£Y£Ht steins and inferences
. Most developmental studies
which address the question of the role of inferences in
text comprehension have looked at children in the 5- to
11-year-old range (Paris & Upton, 1976; Omanson, et al.,
1978), and while a few studies have employed younger
children and noted significant improvements in
performance, they leave unanswered many questions about
potential underlying processing differences. For example,
Poulsen, Kintsch, Kintsch, and Premack (1979) using
picture stories, tested 4-year olds and 6-year olds and
found 6-year olds better able to make stories out of
scrambled pictures, but found 4-year olds performed quite
well in recall of "ordered" stories. They suggest that
while 4-year olds can provide inferences within a clearly
regularized story format to link different components of
the story, only the older children use some sort of
inference-making procedure to link randomly ordered
pictures. Similarly, Wimmer (1980) studied children in
the 4-year-old range in a task involving comprehension of
"well-structured" and "destructured" text. In this study,
it was found that although 4-year olds showed better
recall of the well structured than the destructured
version, they did not show "full comprehension" of text
material. Importantly, Wimmer questions, "what prevents
full comprehension?" and suggests that the answer may lie
11
in a lack of relevant world knowledge, specifically the
knowledge required to figure out the specific causal
connections between the states, actions, and events of the
story. This interpretation of performance differences is
interesting, and clearly suggests the necessity for more
work with children of these ages if we are to delineate
just what is involved in the inferential process in story
comprehension.
According to Nicholas & Trabasso (1981), there are a
number of problems which need to be addressed in any
attempt to carefully examine the role of inference in the
comprehension process. Basically, the problems center on
the question of how the term "inference" is defined—with
almost as many definitions as there have been researchers
interested in the question. The fact that slightly
different meanings have been employed in the development
of theoretical arguments may reflect the many types of
inferences which may exist rather than a serious
communication problem. Recently, Hildyard & Olson (1978)
have reviewed general categories of usage of the term
inference in their attempt to differentiate inferences
into three main classes. In their system of
classification, proposi tional inferences refer to the
implications of explicit propositions. A defining
12
characteristic of prepositional inferences is that it is
the form of the proposition, rather than the content which
determines inference making. Included in this
classification are many types of inferences which have
been described by other researchers. Transitive relations
(e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Trabasso, 1975),
comparative terms (e.g., Olson & Nickerson, 1977), and
class inclusion relations (e.g., Griggs, 1976) are all
subsumed under this general heading. The second class
described are referred to as enabling inferences which are
determined by both content and form, and are seen by
Hildyard & Olson as the links between concepts in a story
which otherwise would not form coherent units. Their
final classification is comprised of pragmatic inferences
which are considered useful in elaborating text material,
but not seen as necessary for comprehension. They result,
primarily, from implicit world knowledge which the
individual brings to the task.
Although the classification model proposed by
Hildyard & Olson is useful as a beginning step, their
interpretation of developmental differences reveal its
limitations. A major conclusion centers on the finding
among children in the 10- to 12-year-old age range that
there is an increasing ability to differentiate
pr opositional from pragmatic inferences. According to
13
Hildyard & Olson, this change was the result of older
children's ability to reject pragmatic inferences as
necessarily true; an ability grounded in increased
"schooled competence", rather than the development of any
inferencing ability. in a related study using 6-, 8-, and
10-year olds, Hildyard (1979) attempted to substantiate
the claim that different types of inferences exist, and
that there are developmental differences in usage. She
found that the youngest children were as capable as the
older children in providing integration and implicit
inferences (which are subclasses of the pragmatic and
enabling inferences discussed above), but were unable to
draw formal, or propositional, inferences. In considering
both of these studies, it seems as though the nature of
underlying process changes are left unexplored. While the
distinctions serve as an aid in thinking about past work
involving inferences with children, they demonstrate more
decisively the breadth of related issues which need to be
addressed.
h taxonomy: ojL inferences . A series of papers, including
Nicholas & Trabasso (1981), Omanson, et al., (1978),
Trabasso & Nicholas (1981), and Warren, et al., (1979),
have been focused on the underlying processing changes
which accompany the development of inferential reasoning.
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in particular, these researchers have been developing a
taxonomy of inferences, based upon their functional
relationship between events in a story. According to
their arguments, some model of language understanding must
encompass any formal definition of inferences, and as was
suggested above, a great deal of this theoretical
foundation is evident in Schank & Abelson's (1977) work on
representation. The event chain model presupposes the
individual to be a flexible processor of information—able
to develop (using information in the narrative as a
starting point) a structure using knowledge about
available connections between events rather than applying
a preconceived higher order structure.
Warren, et al., (1979) provide a description of an
event chain representation which both indicates important
components of the model and relates it to categories found
in story grammar representations. Text structure is
represented in a non-hierarchichal fashion, with this
representation being the result of an analysis of seven
main proposition types and their logical connectives.
Proposition types include a state which describes the
conditions of the physical world, or the conditions of a
character in a story. Events are changes of state, and
consist of two main types--those initiated by the
protagonist and those occuring independently of the
15
protagonist. Changes of state which occur as a result of
the protagonist's voluntary behavior are referred to as
aciiona (internal counterpart—cognition)
, and since the
event chain model description is considered from the point
of view of the protagonist all other state changes are
simply events. Involuntary reactions are classed into
digplays? and ifil£ui^s--corresponding to external movements
and internal states, including affect, intuitions, and
beliefs. The final proposition type, the qoal
r may be
either a voluntary or involuntary internal mental event
representing desires or plans which are held by the
protagonist. The logical connectives which describe
relations between propositions include inferential
relations, which have become the focus of much work in
this area.
Warren, et al., (1979) claim that inferences may be
based on three types of information. The first of these
involves the basic causal connections which occur between
different events and are the result of logical relations.
Inferences based on logical relations are basic structures
which allow a narrative to exist. Within the system
developed here, these logical inferences may be of one of
four classes including motivational inferences, which
involve inferring causes for characters' voluntary
16
thoughts or actions; physical cause inferences which
require inferring "mechanical causes" for events or states
which follow in the story; psychological causation
inferences involving the characters' involuntary actions;
and enablement inferences, where story conditions which
are stated are necessary but not sufficient for a
particular event to have occurred. A second type of
inference centers on informational relations involving
people, objects, times, places, etc.,—the general context
of a particular narrative. Informational inferences do
not deal with causes or consequences and are not tied to
intra-pr oposi tional relationships. Five types of
informational inferences are specified, including
pronominal inferences which specify the antecedents of
pronouns; referential inferences which specify the
antecedents of actions or events and clarify the roles of
people and objects in related propositions; spatio-
temporal inferences which are used to establish times and
places within the story; world-frame inferences which
primarily serve the function of setting constraints on
possible interpretations; and elaborative inferences which
serve to add detail to a story
—
generally irrelevant
circumstances to the progression of the story. A third
type of inference involves judgements about aspects of the
narrative such as characters' action, authors' intentions,
17
etc. These inferences which are primarily evaluative in
nature, draw upon the individual's values surrounding the
situation described.
Related to the taxonomy of inferences described
above, are questions concerning how and when inferences
are made. One line of argument is that inferencing is an
automatic process and all possible inferences will be
generated; a second argument holds that limits need to be
established to describe the comprehension process.
Trabasso and his co-workers hold the belief that an
individual makes only those inferences which are "relevant
to the progress of the narrative", a belief they refer to
as the relevancy hypothesis (Warren, et al., 1979). in
the context of this hypothesis, four degrees of
inferential constraint are proposed, including those
consistent with, but undetermined by the text (usually
considered elaborative or unconstrained inferences);
determined but irrelevant inferences, which are
constrained by material in the narrative; determined and
relevant inferences, which are more tightly constrained
because they are important to the development of the
story; and lastly, those which are overconstr ained or
redundant inferences which duplicate given information.
Warren, et al., (1979) suggest that those inferences which
18
are both determined and relevant are most likely to be
made since they are necessary for event-chain
comprehension. Undetermined and irrelevant inferences are
considered to be unnecessary to understanding, their only
contribution being one of embellishment of the narrative.
It is important to note, however, that the effect of these
inferences may not be trivial in recall, and significant
developmental changes may occur in their usage.
I4e_a_sj2jLejT!ejit o_f. inferences. Most theories of narrative
representation and comprehension have been supported using
free recall as the primary dependent measure. As
discussed earlier, the use of recall has been related to,
and used to support the notion of underlying structural
dimensions in stories with some success (Mandler &
Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1977; Thorndyke, 1977).
Graesser (1981) points to similar success in recall-based
analyses of scriptal theories as well (e.g., Black &
Bower, 1980; Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979).
Whenever free recall is used as a dependent measure,
there is a representation being tapped which relies on
connections made between events in the narrative through
logical inferences. It is becoming apparent that the role
of inference-making as a component of the understanding
process has been implicit in much of the work done in the
area of story comprehension. Using the event-chain
19
representation as a basic assumption, it may be argued
(Omanson, in press; Warren & Trabasso, 1979) that
inferences are acts of comprehension, and their
measurement an alternative (or addition) to the use of
free recall in specifying degree of understanding.
In a number of papers (Graesser, Robertson, &
Anderson, 1981; Graesser, Robertson, Lovelace, &
Swinehart, 1980), Graesser and his co-workers have
attempted to examine the usefulness of employing
inferential components to delineate the comprehension
process. The primary technique used here has been to
expose inferences made during comprehension. Questions
which may be asked include "why-" and "how-" questions
which expose causal information (and fall into the logical
inference category specified by Warren, et al., 1979); and
"where-", "what-", and "who-" questions which are similar
to the broad category of informational inferences
discussed earlier. Graesser, Robertson, & Clark (1980),
(reported in Graesser, 1981) used a question-answering
procedure to explore the role of context in the
interpretation of an inference question. Graesser, et
al., (1980) examined the effect of three context
conditions. In the no-context condition subjects were
presented with a target statement in isolation, with that
20
statement probed by questions requiring inferences. The
prior-context condition included, along with the target
statement, the narrative events immediately preceding it;
while in the full-context condition, the subject received
the entire passage before the target statement was probed.
Using these different levels of context condition, it was
possible to develop a model which predicted from where the
final inference representation would be generated. While
conclusions drawn from their analysis are varied, a few
seem most central to their arguments. To begin with, it
is the set of prior sentences, rather than the immediately
preceding sentence, that is most responsible for
inferences to be made— a finding which implies that a
given sentence is linked to a representation in memory of
some integrated information. A second finding was that
inferences associated to a given statement are rarely
generated by subsequent information. Virtually all of the
inferences associated with a given statement will be
established upon its occurrence, a result of the statement
alone, or by the statement together with prior context.
Finally, and related to the previous finding, the later in
a narrative the target statement is, the higher the
likelihood of its producing inferences which remain in the
final representation.
The findings of Graesser and his co-workers lend
21
themselves well to the causal chain model discussed
earlier, and the question-answering procedure for probing
this representation appears to be a useful technique for
establishing how actions and events in a narrative are
conceptually related (Graesser, 1981; Warren, et al.,
1979). Lehnert (1977) argues that the ability to answer
questions is the strongest demonstration of text
comprehension, preferable even to recall measures because
often, reasonable recall of a narrative can be made
without including any inferences, which are necessary for
real understanding. Warren, et al., (1979) take what may
be seen as an even stronger position on this issue,
beginning with the assumption that the event chain model
presupposes the making of inferences as an integral
component of comprehension, leading to more complete
recall. A questioning procedure may be used, it is
claimed, to promote the making of text-connecting
inferences during the listening to, or reading of, text.
Statement oJL the Problem
The present study was formulated to address some of
the issues raised in the preceding discussion. Four- and
7-year-old children were asked a specific set of questions
22
either "on-line" at the earliest opportunity during the
story presentation, or at the end of the story, or not at
all. Each child listened to three stories, each
representing a different level of causal relation in a
critical story event; physical, psychological, or
enablement. within each story, three types of inference
constraint levels were specified—logical, constrained
informational, and unconstrained informational. At the
completion of each story, children were asked to recall
the story and determine whether each of a series of six
pictures "went with the story". After hearing all three
stories, children were again shown all the pictures and
probed as to their reasons for accepting or rejecting
each
.
The three question-timing conditions were employed in
order to ascertain whether there is a developmental change
in ability to generate inferences as a function of amount
of information provided in a story. The findings reported
by Graesser and his co-workers (Graesser ,1981; Graesser,
et al., 1980) suggest that information which follows a
target statement does not aid in inference-making ability,
and while this apparently is a reasonable description of
adult comprehension, it is less apparent with young
children. It has been suggested by a number of
researchers that world knowledge may be the limiting
23
factor in young children's lack of ability to make causal
connections necessary for comprehension of narratives.
Although the end-of-story condition does not increase
world knowledge, it does provide— in subsequent story
events— information which will clarify and/or constrain
the inferences required of a given target sentence. It
was therefore hypothesized that while older children
should reveal no differences in ability to infer or recall
as a function of question-timing, younger chilren should
perform better on inference questions and recall measures
when provided with more complete story information before
questioning, i.e., in the end-of-story condition.
Following the claim made by Warren, et al., (1979) that
comprehension is influenced by the making of text
connecting inferences, it is further hypothesized that
children in the two questioning conditions will perform
better in recall than children in the no-question
condition.
Three levels of inference constraint (logical,
constrained informational, and unconstrained
informational) are also included in this study. This
manipulation, as well as the following one, is included in
an effort to address more directly the kind of question
raised by Wimmer (1980) and alluded to earlier, and more
24
specifically to explore the usefulness of the inference
taxonomy developed by Warren, et al., (1979). Logical
inferences represent the basic causal connections between
events which allow narratives to exist, and reflect
conversational convention and basic linguistic skills.
The central role of logical inference-making in
comprehension and communication leads to the hypothesis
that at both ages, logical inferences will be most likely
to be made and to occur in recall protocols.
Informational inferences determine the general context of
a narrative, and represent completeness of interpretation.
Constrained informational inferences which are determined
by, and relevant to the text are necessary for full
comprehension. Indirectly, this type of inference
reflects the general description which was provided by
Hildyard & Olson (1978) with regard to 12-year olds'
increased facility in accepting or rejecting inferences as
necessarily true. Since older chilren are likely to have
established representations of story events which include
many more connections with events and actions external to
the story, it is hypothesized that they will perform
better on inference demands reflecting this type of
constraint than younger chilren will. Younger children
may be less constrained by representation demands,
however, and thus produce informational inferences of the
25
unconstained, undetermined, and irrelevant types faster
than the older children will. These unconstrained
informational inferences may also be more likely to turn
up in recall protocols of younger children following
questioning than with young children in the no-question
condition, since the representation of the story is more
likely to include this type of inference after being made
through a questioning procedure. Further, differences
between younger and older children should be noted in
response reaction times, with older children displaying
faster responding to constrained than unconstrained
inference probes, and young children showing no difference
in their response times to these two types of queries.
Warren, et al., (1979) identify four classes of
logical causality inferences: motivation, physical cause,
psychological cause, and enablement. The last three of
these are included in this study. As mentioned
previously, three versions of each of three stories were
constructed. These varied in only one respect, the type
of logical inference required in one of the two logical
inferences in the complete story.
Understanding the nature of physical causality is one
of the earliest concepts acquired. Nelson (1973), in a
classification of earliest words used, found that very
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young children use words which represent the production of
movements or changes in their world. whiteman (1967)
using groups of 5- and 6-year olds and 8- and 9-year olds,
conducted a study concerned with the understanding of
psychological causality. The comprehension of short
stories related to psychological defense mechanisms varied
significantly with age. Younger children displayed
successful levels of understanding only 10% of the time,
while older children were successful 71% of the time, in
a follow-up study, a series of questions dealing with
physical causality were employed and it was found that in
this case, age differences in performance were not
significant. More recently, Glasberg & Aboud (1982)
studied 5- and 7-year-old children in an attempt to
discover age-related changes in emotional experience. The
results of their study indicated that older children were
likely to attribute emotional states to a range of
experiences, including both physical and psychological
components. Younger chilren, in contrast, did not display
this range of components. They saw physical causes as
playing a much more causal role at all levels of emotional
experience. Enabling relationships which leave the causal
link between events more ambiguous are likely to have a
similar effect, since they also require an understanding
of a range of potential causal factors. For these
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reasons, it is hypothesized that children of both ages
will perform similarly and do their best when they
experience the physical causality version of stories.
With the psychological causality and enablement versions,
however, the older children will be more likely to produce
inferences in both comprehension and recall than the
younger children will.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Fifty-four children in each of two age groups
participated in the study. The range of ages in each of
the groups was 4-years, 6-months to 5-years, and 7-years,
6-months to 8-years, with an equal number of boys and
girls at each age level. Seven four-year olds did not
complete the warm-up task, and were replaced. All of the
children were from middle-class families in the greater
Springfield, Mass. area.
DejLisn. The study employed a 2 (age) x 3 (question-timing
condition) x 3 (inference constraint) x 3 (causality
version) mixed design, with the last two factors within
subjects. In order to ensure counterbalanced orders of
causality versions, and equal representation of each story
context, 18 different sequences balancing story context,
causality version, and order were generated, and one child
at each age in each question-timing condition was assigned
to each of these sequences.
Materials. Three stories were created or adapted such
that all included the same type of target inferences.
They ranged from 80 to 84 words in length, and contained
nine or ten propositions. Three versions were generated
for each story according to the manipulation specified
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above. All versions of the stories are to be found in
Appendix A. Each version of the three stories was
recorded on a separate cassette in a single female voice.
Intonation, temporal, and intensity characteristics of the
tapes were carefully balanced. The entire session was
recorded using a second cassette recorder.
Two "warm-up" stories were also constructed and
given in fixed order to all children. The first of these
was 25 words long with four propositions, and the second
was 52 words in length with 7 propositions. These, too,
are available in Appendix A. The gradual increase in
length and complexity was arranged to enable that each
child to understand the type of response required.
Eighteen pictures (black and white line drawings)
were created, with six pictures used in conjunction with
each of the three stories. For each of the stories, three
pictures reflect either stated or inferred text material,
while the remaining pictures depict non-story events. Two
pictures were developed for use with the second warm-up
story. All pictures are included in Appendix B.
Five plates from the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
(PPVT) were used to assess the younger children's
familiarity with concepts employed in the stories. These
may also be seen in Appendix B.
Procedure . After children became acclimated to the
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laboratory setting, they and their parent(s) were invited
to play the "story game" in a nearby room. The child was
then told that he or she would hear a story and would be
asked questions about it. For all children, the
experimenter then played the first warm-up story on the
tape recorder, asking two premise questions and two
inference questions at the end of the story. After this
brief period of questioning, the experimenter then asked
the child to re-tell the story, and provided general
approval and encouragement. The second warm-up story was
then introduced, with the experimenter employing on-line
questioning with children in this experimental group; end-
of-story questioning with children in the second
experimental group; and no questioning with children in
the third group. Following completion of the story, all
children were asked to re-tell it. Following recall of
this story, all children were shown two pictures and asked
to tell whether or not they "show something that goes with
the story". In this warm-up task all children were also
probed for their reason for answering this question, in
order to ascertain whether they understood the task
requirements
.
The test materials were then introduced, with the
procedure for each child following that prescribed by the
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questioning condition and sequence to which the child was
assigned. After free recall of each story, two premise
information questions were asked of all children. To
equalize the time elapsing before recall, a delay,
equivalent to the period needed to ask the inference
questions in the end-of-story condition was imposed for
all children in the on-line and no-inference-question
conditions.
Immediately following the premise information
questioning, all children were asked to determine whether
each of a series of six pictures showed something which
went with the story; and immediately after the third story
questioning was completed—all children were shown all 18
pictures a second time, this time with probes concerning
their reasons for selecting or rejecting each picture.
Following presentation of all 18 pictures, the 4-year olds
were given an abbreviated vocabulary test with the PPVT
plates described above, to make sure that the term
"excitement" was not an unfamiliar one at this age.
C H A P T E R III
RESULTS
The presentation of results is organized in five
major sections. These include an analysis of responses to
inference questions; examination of free recall data;
correlations between different free recall measures and
responses to inference questions; analysis of responses to
pictures; and consideration of responses to premise
information questions and vocabulary items.
Inference questions .
Correct responding. The mean number of correct
responses to inference questions may be seen in Figure l f
as a function of age and causality version. After
preliminary analyses showed no order, story version, or
sex effects, an analysis of variance was carried out on
these data as a function of age, causality version,
question-timing condition, and inference type. Overall,
the mean number of correct responses increased with age.
Four-year olds correctly answered an average of 4.11 of
the six questions asked for each story, while 7-year olds
correctly answered an average of 5.19 questions,
F_(l,68) =46.38, p_<.001. The greatest number of correct
answers were given with the physical causality version
(4.89), followed by the enablement version (4.62), and the
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CAUSALITY VERSION
Figure 1. Mean number of correct responses as a
function of causality version and age.
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psychological causality version (4.44). This causality
effect was significant, £(2,136) =3.25, p_<.05, and
Bonferroni i-tests indicated that only performance in the
physical and psychological causality versions differed
significantly (£(71)=2.54, p_<.05). Furthermore, as may be
clearly seen in Figure 1, the age difference in correct
answers to inference questions differed with causality
version (£(2, 136) =3.40, E <.05). Performance on inference
questions in the physical causality version did not vary
significantly between 4- and 7-year olds, while the mean
number of correct responses in the psychological causality
and enablement versions increased significantly as a
function of age (Bonferroni £'s(136)= 5.50, 3.06,
£' s<,05)
.
Age differences also occurred in the pattern of
responding in the on-line, and end-of-story question-
timing conditions in the three different causality
versions (age x causality version x question-timing
condition, £(2,136) =3.02, £=.05). As can be seen in Figure
2, performance on inference questions was about the same
in both question-timing conditions in all causality
versions among 7-year olds, and while 4-year olds showed
no difference in ability to answer questions as a
function of question timing in either the physical or
psychological causality versions, the mean number of
CAUSALITY VERSION
Figure 2. Mean number of correct responses as a
function of causality version, ques-
tion-timing condition, and age.
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correct responses in the enablement version was
significantly greater in the end-of-st ory question
condition than in the on-line condition (Bonferroni
£(136)=2.75, £<.05).
The mean number of correct answers to inference
questions may be seen in. Figure 3 as a function of age and
inference type. Overall, children responded with more
correct answers to questions about unconstrained
inferences than to questions about logical or constrained
inferences; the means were 5.46
, 4.89, and 3.60,
respectively, £(2 , 136) =68.45
, p_<.001. Bonferroni t-tests
indicated significant differences in performance between
unconstrained, and logical and constrained, and between
logical and constrained inference questions (Bonferroni
i's(136)= 3.05
, 8.34 , 7.82, e's<.05). Important age
differences, which help to clarify these results, also
were present, however. Seven-year olds answered logical
inference questions best, while 4-year olds were most
facile with the unconstrained inference questions (age x
inference type, £ ( 2 , 1 3 6 ) =3 1 . 3 2 , p.<.001). Moreover,
younger children were significantly poorer at answering
either the logical or constrained inference questions than
they were at answering the unconstrained type question
(Bonferroni £(35)=5.53, p_'s<.05). On the other hand, 7-
year olds, although most adept with the logical inference
37
INFERENCE TYPE
Figure Mean number of correct responses as
a function of inference type and
age
.
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questions, did almost as well with unconstrained
questions, while showing significantly less ability to
answer the constrained inference questions (Bonferroni
i(35)=4.59, B<.05). Even so, it is also apparent from
Figure 3, that the performance of 7-year olds did not drop
as dramatically as that of 4-year olds when asked to make
constrained inferences.
Logical inference questions were more likely to be
answered correctly in the physical causality version
(M=1.86 for the two questions of this type), than in
either the psychological causality or enablement versions
(M's = 1.52 and 1.51, respectively), 2(4, 272) =4.66
, p_<.001.
This facilitating effect of the physical causality version
for answering inference questions was further supported by
examination of the causality version x inference type x
question-timing condition interaction, as seen in Figure
4, £(4,272) =2.49, £<.05. With the physical causality
version, children were able to answer all types of
inference questions, logical, constrained, or
unconstrained, equally well whenever the questions were
asked, i.e., on-line, or at the end of the story. That
was not the case with the other causality versions,
however. Logical inference questions in the psychological
causality version were more easily answered in the on-line
question condition, and constrained inference questions in
39
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the enablement version were more readily answered in the
end-of-story question condition (Bonferroni £' s (7 1) =2.8
,
4.5, fi's<.05).
Tim£ £s JLfiSfifind. An analysis of variance was
carried out on the time to respond to inference questions
answered correctly as a function of age, causality
version, question-timing condition, and inference type.
Although there was no overall age difference in response
times, the average time to respond was affected by
inference type. Logical inferences were made more rapidly
than constrained or unconstrained inferences (M's=1.7,
1.9, and 2.2 sec, respectively), £(2,136) =11.46, p_<.001.
As may be seen in Figure 5, the response time analysis
also revealed an age pattern which was consistent with the
question-answering data described above. Four-year olds
were equally fast in responding to all types of questions,
while 7-year olds showed a clear progression from very
fast responding with logical inference questions to
significantly slower response times to constrained and
unconstrained inference questions (Bonferroni
£'S (35) =2.79, 4.73, p_ , s<.05).
Free recall .
Several dependent measures of free recall were
analyzed. These included several indices of idea units
(proportion of total idea units provided, proportion of
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central idea units provided, ratio of central idea units
to total idea units in the protocols), expansions or
elaborations, number of words, and comprehension ratings.
Preliminary analyses revealed no order, story version, or
sex effects of significance. The main analysis for each
of these measures was a mixed, 2 (age) x 3 (question-
timing condition) x 3 (causality version) analysis of
variance, with the last variable a repeated measure.
Idea Units . Analysis of the proportion of total idea
units indicated that older children recalled more of the
story than did younger children, 59.25% and 28.60%,
respectively, and this was the only significant effect
(£(1,102)=165.95, p_<.001). Analysis of central idea units
revealed similar results, with 7-year olds recalling
77.52% of the central idea units provided, and 4-year olds
recalling 45.23%. This was, again, the only significant
effect (£(1,102) =139.75, rK.OOl). Analysis of the ratio
of central idea units to total idea units in each child's
recall protocols revealed that although younger children
do not recall as much as older children do, more of their
recall is comprised of ideas central to the story. Thus,
the proportion of 4-year olds' recall which was central
was 58.68%, while for 7-year olds, this proportion was
46.27% (£(1,102)=29.65, p_<.001).
Expansions . The number of ideas not expressed in
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the original story which were included in recall protocols
also varied as a function of age, with 7-year olds
including in their recall an average of 2.14 expansions
per story, while 4-year olds included an average of 1.49
expansions per story (£(1,102)- 14.29, p_<.001). Question-
timing condition also affected the number of expansions,
F_(2,102)=23.40, B<.001. The average number of expansions
in the two question conditions did not differ, but they
averaged (fl-2.23) significantly higher than the average
number of expansions in the no-question conditon (M=.98)
(Bonferroni £(107)- 5.95, £K.05). As may be seen in Figure
6, this timing-of-question effect on expansions was
different with different causality versions, however
(P_(4,204)=3.42, p_<.01). Those children questioned at the
end of each story averaged 2.02, 2.27, and 2.52 expansions
for the physical, psychological, and enablement versions,
respectively. Bonferroni i-tests indicated that the
number of expansions in recall of the physical causality
version was significantly less than for the enablement
version (£(204) =3.33
, p_<.05) , while expansions in recall
of physical causality and psychological causality
versions, or psychological and enablement versions, did
not differ significantly. Children in the on-line
question condition, i.e., those who were asked inference
questions during the story presentation, showed a
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CAUSALITY VERSION
Figure 6. Mean number of expansions as a function
of causality version and question-tim-
ing condition.
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different pattern of expansions. More expansions in
recall occurred following the physical causality version
(11=2.66) than following either the psychological (H-2.X9),
or enablement (M-2.20J versions (Bonferroni £'s
(204)«3.13, £<.05).
Numbec & w^ds. Similar results were obtained in an
analysis of the number of words in the recall protocols.
Older children's protocols were comprised of more words
(M = 6 0 . 6 0 ) than younger children's (M=33.91),
£(1,102)=119.63, U < .001. Causality version also affected
the average number of words in children's recall. The
number of words recalled following the physical causality
version averaged 49.88, while the number of words
following the psychological version was 45.58, and the
number of words following the enablement version was 46.33
(£(2,204)= 4.03, fi<.05).
Comprehension ratings. It is interesting that a
comprehension rating based on a rather global evaluation
of recall, proved to be sensitive to a number of
manipulations which were not detected by the more
constrained analyses on number of words and idea units.
These ratings were carried out by three naive raters who
were instructed to assign 1 to 5 points to each recall
protocol, reflecting degree of story understanding.
Interrater reliability was very high (97% agreement with
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7-year olds', and 92% with 4-year olds', protocols); and
consistent with previous analyses, 7-year olds' protocols
received a higher rating (M = 3.49), than those of 4-year
olds (H=2.08), £(1,102)= 150.21, p_<.001. At both ages,
causality version clearly affected comprehension
(£(2,204) =3.03, £=.05). Comprehension of the physical
causality version was rated as greater (H = 2.*90) than for
either the psychological causality version (H-2.75), or
the enablement version (M=2.71) (Bonferroni i's (107) =2.24,
2.29, p_'s<.05). As may be seen in Figure 7, different
effects of question-timing condition were noted for each
age level, however (£(2,102) =5.41, e<.05). Although it was
expected that the comprehension of 4-year olds in either
of the two question conditions would be enhanced by the
questions, and the results were in the predicted direction
(average comprehension rating for question conditions,
2.13; average rating for the no-question condition, 1.98),
these differences were not significant. Older children,
for whom it was believed the question condition was not
critical, revealed an interesting pattern of results.
Their comprehension was rated highest in the no-question
condition (M=3.74), and while average comprehension
ratings in the end-of-story question condition did not
differ significantly from this (11=3.59), average ratings
for the on-line question condition were significantly
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lower (M = 3.16)(Bonferroni £'s(108) = 4.14 f 3.07, E's<.05).
It appears that for older children, answering inference
questions during the processing of story material is
disruptive and leads to impaired recall.
Relations among dependent measurps. For a number of
theoretical and practical reasons, the relations between a
number of the dependent measures described above were
examined. The argument put forth by Graesser (1981), and
Trabasso and his colleagues (Warren, et al., 1979) that
question-answering is a reasonable alternative, or a good
addition, to recall measures as a means of studying
comprehension processes has not been adequately studied;
the correlations between responses to inference questions
and various recall measures were seen as addressing that
issue. A second concern resulted from the large variety
of approaches to assessing recall that have surfaced
recently. Examination of correlations between various
recall measures themselves, was seen as potentially useful
in identifying strengths or weaknesses of measures.
Table 1 shows that the correlations between correct
answers to inference questions and recall measures were
very high, and quite similar, ranging from r.= + .69 to
r.= + .73 for the four recall measures. Within this narrow
range, it is still of some interest that the greatest
degree of relationship was between inference question
Table 1
Corre lations between Inference Questions
and Recall Measures
Responses t£ inference questions
£fgaU ^1 sample 4-ye^r olds 7-vear oldsmeasures ' YV<?l1 VXUi?
Comprehensi on
rating +.72* +.53*
Total idea
units +.71* +.51*
+ .26
+ .10
Central idea
units +.73* +.51* +.13
Number of
words +.69* +.38* +.28
*p<.001
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responses and the proportion of recall protocols which
represented central idea units. A core of comprehension
apparently can be tapped either through questions or
derived recall measures of this sort. Inference question
responses related only minutely less well with the
comprehension ratings, again support for the notion that
these indices, although applied at different times, and
representing very different levels of measurement, were
assessing a common understanding. In general terms, at
least, questions about inferences made during text
processing are getting at similar comprehension processes
to those called upon in recall. Of course, the
correlations drop off considerably when age groups are
examined separately. This was especially true with the
older children, reflecting the very little variability in
inferencing ability at this older age, with the particular
questions employed.
The second question centers on comparisons between
the various recall measures employed in this study. As
can be seen in Table 2, for the full sample, these
dependent measures are all highly and similarly
correlated, ranging from .r=+.85 to r_=+.93. Even when the
age groups were considered separately, most of these
relations remain strong. The most apparent change was
with respect to word count. At age 7, the number of words
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Table 2
Corre l ation ?, among Recall Measure s
(all significant at p<.001)
Total idea
units + .93
Full sample Central idea
units +.90 + .93
Number of
words + .87 + .90 + .85
Comprehen- Total Central
sisn rating idea units idea units
Tota l idea
units + .89
4-year olds
Central idea
units +.84
Number of
words + .80
+ .89
+ .88 + .79
Comprehen- Total Central
Sion ratings idea units idea units
Tota l idea
units + .84
7-year olds
Central idea
units +.72
Number of
words + .54
+ .77
+ .64 + .50
Comprehen- Total Central
sion ratings idea units idea units
52
in recall clearly did not relate as highly with the other
measures, reflecting no doubt the quite complete, quite
invariant, size of recall protocols for these stories at
this age. It may well be that simple word counts are
useful indices of comprehension only for younger children.
Not surprisingly, since both of these measures are
based on idea unit scoring, maximum correlation was
obtained between total idea units and the proportion of
central idea units in recall. More interestingly, no less
of a relationship was shown between total idea units and
the comprehension ratings, and in this instance, no common
metric could be contributing. Several additional factors
point to the merits of the comprehension ratings as well.
First, it is a technique which can be readily and reliably
employed by naive judges with minimal instruction. More
importantly, the ratings were as sensitive as any other
measure to most variables of interest in this study, and
at the same time provided a more detailed picture of age-
related question-timing effects. Apparently, the
comprehension rating was able to capture some global
quality of the protocol which could not be characterized
as well by those other measures involving discrete
components
.
Response? io pictures .
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Responses to pictures were scored by three naive
raters on a scale from 0 to 2. if the child's response to
a picture was completely in error, that response was
scored as zero. if the child not only gave the correct
answer, but also provided an appropriate rationale, that
response was scored as two. A score of one was given if
the response was correct but rationale was wrong, or if
the response was wrong but the rationale made sense of a
wrong answer. The analysis conducted on these scores was
a mixed 2 (age) x 3 (question-timing condition) x 3
(causality version) analysis of variance with the last
variable a repeated measure. Older children's responses
to pictures received an average score of 10.43, and the
average score for younger children was 9.27, out of a
potential 12 points (£(1,102) =29.14, £<.001). Although
the pattern of correct responding appeared quite similar
at both ages, and the on-line-questioning condition
resulted in the best performance at both ages, it was only
at age 7 that the questioning conditions resulted in
significantly different scores (£(2,102) =3.25, p_<.05
Four-year olds scores averaged 9.55, 9.14, and 9.12 for
the on-line, end-of -story , and no-question conditions,
respectively. For 7-year olds, the scores for children in
the on-line-question condition averaged 10.61, while the
average score for responses of children in the end-of-
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story condition was 9.94, and in the no-question condition
was 9.85 (Bonferrori t's (108) =2.57
, 2.92, p_'s<.05).
Nine of the presented pictures (3 from each story)
depicted non-story events, and as expected, 7-year olds
were easily able, and 4-year olds less likely to reject,
these pictures (M's=8.50 and 6.81, respectively),
i(106)=8.50
, p_<.001. Although it was expected that
children at both ages would be equally likely to judge as
appropriate the six pictures (two from each story) which
depict story events, 7-year olds proved to be better at
this task as well (fl's=5.31 and 4.90, respectively),
t(106)=2.19, p_<.05.
Two separate analyses, on "correctness" score, and
time to respond to picture, were carried out with respect
to the one picture for each story depicting one of the
required logical inferences. No overall age differences
in either correct responding or in response latency were
obtained. At both ages, responses to the logical
inference picture for the physical causality version were
scored as significantly more correct (1.80), than for
either the psychological causality version (1.57) or the
enablement version (1.56) (£ ( 2 , 2 0 4) =4 . 6 9 , p_<.01).
Response times to these logical inference pictures were
also significantly shorter for the physical causality
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version (1.6 sec) than for either the psychological
causality version (2.2 sec) or the enablement version (2.3
sec) (£(2,80)=6.31, p.<.01).
These responses to pictures were not totally in
accord with the results obtained in the analysis of
inference questions or recall. The average score for all
pictures was unaffected by causality version; moreover,
the response to the one logical inference picture was
significantly and equivalently better with the physical
causality version at both ages. it was expected that
older children's inferences of possible causal factors
would lead them to include these pictures with the other
causality versions as well. Secondly, the timing of
inference questions affected picture responding for both
age groups in a similar fashion, i.e., best performance
was in the on-line question condition. This stands in
contrast to the debilitating effects of on-line questions
at age 7 previously reported. The third instance of
results which seem somewhat at odds is the rather
equivocal pattern of responses to story and non-story
pictures. The fact that 7-year olds were able to reject
pictures depicting non-story events more readily than 4-
year olds is consonant with the inference question
performance where 7-year olds made less unconstrained, and
more constrained inferences. Seven-year olds were also
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better than 4-year olds at judging whether story depicting
Pictures went with the story, however, and this finding
did not fit the previous pattern of 4-year olds'
relatively good responding when given strong story
support.
It is difficult to worry too seriously about the
inconsistencies noted above between picture responses, and
recall and inferences, however, as there were several
inadequacies of the picture task. it was obvious that
there was considerable misinterpretation of the pictures'
meaning; the development of ratings considering the
rationale of answers about the relevance of the pictures
provided a partial correction, but even so, the pictures
were clearly more ambiguous than was anticipated. The
picture queries themselves were not always communicated
unambiguously to the children either; it seemed at times
as though they interpreted the questions much more
generally, and were reacting not so much to particulars of
the content, as to other, more summary features such as
temporal sequencing or main character depiction. Finally,
the picture probes followed presentation and recall of all
three stories, and the delays and intervening material may
well have confused the children.
£ne_m._i s_e_ ajid
_z_o_ca.___ula._ry_ me_a.s_ur_e_.s_. Responses to
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questions about premise information as well as vocabulary
requirements of the stories were examined. Seven-year
olds were able to correctly answer premise information
questions 97% of the time and 4-year olds were correct 92%
of the time. This high level of correct responding was
indicative of the children's active involvement in the
listening task, and provided evidence of their abilities
to remember the basic story material. The short
vocabulary test administered to all 4-year olds was aimed
at ascertaining whether the term "excitement" was familiar
to them. More than 85% of the children correctly
identified the picture chosen rather arbitrarily to
represent the term, evidence that the concept was
understood at this age level, even with virtually no
contextual support.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
This study sheds considerable light on several
important developmental features of story comprehension
and recall. Recently, models of text comprehension have
emphasized the concept of schema driven expectancies which
guide understanding; and questions have arisen concerning
when, and from where, these expectancies are generated. A
central idea of this paper is that text can only become
meaningful when relations between events become clear, and
while this is not a new idea (e.g., Nicholas & Trabasso,
1981; Schank & Abelson, 1977), it remains an important
directive in the quest for process factors involved in
story-related schema models. The recent work of Trabasso
and his co-workers concerning inference taxonomies
emphasizes functional relationships between events in
text, and clearly views the individual as actively
developing a representation of text by using knowledge
about available connections between events. The evidence
provided in this paper takes this notion one step further
and points to the differential development in ability to
generate specific types of relations between narrative
events
.
Differential reliance on the strength of the
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causal chain at 4- and 7-years points to one important
developmental change. Four-year olds, when provided
physical causality information, can utilize their
knowledge to aid comprehension of stories; with weaker
causality versions, they clearly did not understand as
well as older children. A parallel can be seen in younger
children's need for additional story material for
comprehension, at least when presented with the weakest
versions of the causality chain, while older children did
not benefit from added story material. A third
characterization of story comprehension development
concerns the different patterns of use of logical,
unconstrained, and constrained inferences. Each of these
three points will next be examined in more detail.
Strength o_X the causality chain . The responses of 4-year
olds to inference questions indicates that their
comprehension ability is related to the type of causality
information which they encounter in stories. They were
able to utilize information for question answering most
readily after hearing the physical causality version, and
since this causality version represents the strongest
example of a causal chain included in this study, it is
important to note that younger children are able to use
this physical causality information at least, to connect
up story events. Their performance was less good,
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however, after hearing the enablement and psychological
causality versions. Of course, it was important to
ascertain whether this inability was simply a reflection
of younger children's lack of understanding of the concept
employed in the psychological causality version, and the
vocabulary test effectively ruled out this possibility.
Apparently then, it was the rather complex application of
causal knowledge required that baffled the children here.
Older children, in contrast, were able to utilize the
causal chain, and incorporate information relevant to
inference-making regardless of which causality version
they heard.
Further support for the notion that the strength of
the causality chain affects comprehension was evident with
respect to children's abilities to answer specific types
of inference questions given varying amounts of story
information. When children heard the physical causality
version, all types of inference questions were answered
equally well, regardless of when questions were asked.
This indicates that their story representations were very
complete; apparently, the children had minimal difficulty
incorporating this physical causality information and
related interpretations of story events. With the other
causality versions, this was not the case. For example,
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in the enablement version, which represented the weakest
causality version, constrained inference questions were
more readily answered in the end-of-story question
condition. Constrained inference-making requires a story
representation which is well developed to allow for
meaningful extractions of specific events and their
relations. it is interesting that in this weakest
causality version, children needed the added story
information provided in the full story, in order to make
the appropriate inferences to answer questions. Together,
these findings suggest that not only are individual causal
events responded to differentially—but they carry with
them a set of expectations and specific possibilities for
interpretation of story meaning which enhance the story
representation.
The facilitating effect of a strong causality chain
on text processing was also evident in recall analyses.
At both ages, children's recall was lengthier and was
rated as showing a higher level of comprehension when they
experienced the physical causality version than with
either the psychological or the enablement versions. A
related finding was that with the enablement version there
were more elaborations during recall when children were
questioned about story events after hearing the entire
story. Since this version represented the weakest
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causality version presented, it also suggests that the
representation called upon in recall is not as tightly
constrained when the event-chain is relatively weak; and
children are likely to call upon information from direct
questioning to fill out their story accounts. The story
representation developed by children when listening to the
physical causality version during the on-line questioning
of story events led to more elaborations in recall,
indicating that with this strong causality version, a more
tightly constrained representation could be developed as
the story unfolded. Children at both ages were also
better able to correctly respond to the pictures which
illustrated the logical inferences after listening to the
physical causality version, and their response times were
also more rapid.
The pattern of results which emerged with respect to
this causality version manipulation indicate support for
the event-chain formulation; clearly, text-based phenomena
and children's ability to utilize information provided are
critical here. It is important to note that all causality
versions presented in this study shared the same basic
structure or grammar and would have been treated as
essentially the same story from a more general story
schema description. A model simply stressing the
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application of a preconceived higher-order structure which
shapes the processing of a passage would not suffice as an
explanation for the differential comprehension effects
obtained here. The lack of any order effects upon
inferencing or recall also suggests limitations to story
schema explanations.
AffiOiini Ql Story material avai lable. Seven-year olds'
ability to answer inference questions was unaffected by
the timing of the questions, regardless of causality
version. This finding is consonant with that of Graesser
and his co-workers (Graesser, 1981; Graesser, et al.,
1980), and was expected insofar as 7-year olds were
dealing with the story materials included in this study in
a fashion similar to that seen in adult comprehension.
Younger children, however, when listening to the
enablement version, which provides the least causal
information, were better able to answer inference
questions when given more story information, i.e., in the
end-of-story question condition. It was expected that a
facilitating effect of increased story information would
be apparent for the younger children in all causality
versions. The finding that this was an accurate
description of 4-year olds' inferencing abilities only
when provided the least causality information, however, is
certainly consistent with the expectation that inferences
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related to story development would be enhanced when the
child had more information available. As detailed above,
the children apparently did not need this added
information given stronger causality chains.
Recall analyses indicated that the timing of
questions about story events influenced the manner in
which text-connecting inferences were employed. At both
ages the number of elaborations made during recall was
greater in the conditions where questions were asked than
in the no-question condition. For 7-year olds,
comprehension was rated highest in the no-question
condition, significantly higher than in the on-line
question condition. Four-year olds' recall protocols
were rated slightly higher in comprehension in the
question conditions and lowest in the no-question
condition, almost the reverse of the 7-year old data.
Questions apparently cause disruption of the processing of
story materials only for the older children. Perhaps the
inference questions simply do not correspond well with
those the children are most likely to be generating at
this age level. If they have developed an independent
strategy for incorporating information relevant to the
story, and if these "private" questions, so to speak, are
not the same as those being asked by the experimenter, it
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is perhaps not surprising that the standard inference
questions were a hindrance. in any event, it is clear
that interruptions of the story impair the older chilren's
processing of that story material for later recall-while
the same interruptions for story-related questions if
anything, enhance the processing of story material for
younger children.
RSllS. flX specific inference tYPes. Children at both ages
were quite willing to provide answers to unconstrained
inference questions, indicating no lack of willingness to
embellish the story line, even at the youngest ages.
Older children were significantly slower in responding to
these unconstrained inferences, however; indicating that
by the age of seven, children tend to restrict their range
of inferences, so that information not strongly dictated
by the story is increasingly difficult to integrate.
Logical inferences represent basic causal
connections between story events, and while 7-year olds
were better able to answer these questions than 4-year
olds, the performance of 4-year olds indicated that these
types of inferences were well within reach. Since
comprehension in a wide range of tasks has been linked to
simple cause and effect relations, it is perhaps not
surprising that the younger children should be able to
utilize this knowledge and provide these inference
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bridges. Even with logical inferences, however, there was
some improvement by age 7, reflecting the older children's
ability to incorporate relevant story information
regardless of which causality version they heard.
The ability of children to answer constrained
inference questions provides further delineation of the
nature of story comprehension. Roland Barthes (1977) has
suggested that, "to understand a narrative is not merely
to follow the unfolding of the story, it is also to
project. ..the narrative 'thread* ...to listen to a
narrative is not merely to move from one word to the next,
it is also to move from one level to the next".
Constrained inferences embellish the narrative 'thread',
and enable the listener to find consistent ties, not only
within the story, but to aspects of their knowledge
outside the story as well. The contrast in ability to
apply knowledge pertinent to the story materials at the
two ages is striking. The relative inability of younger
children to correctly answer constrained inferences may be
indicative of several inadequacies. It is possible that
4-year olds simply did not remember the story; however
their almost perfect recall of premise information belies
this interpretation. More likely, 4-year olds may simply
fail to apply information that is available to them. It
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may be that they just do not have sufficient world
knowledge to use to connect up story events. Seven-year
olds were able to employ this type of construction,
although their performance was clearly not at the level
for logical inferences. Obviously, the development of
constrained inferencing abilities follows a longer time
course than was examined in this study.
Response times to inference questions are supportive
of this general analysis. Children at both ages responded
very and equally rapidly to the logical inference
questions, which represent basic causal connections. it
is not surprising that this is the case, as little effort
should be necessary to integrate such important inferences
into the story line. Four-year olds responded at about
the same speed to all types of inference questions. Since
it has been shown that their ability to answer constrained
inference questions is much less than that of older
children, it is unlikely that their rapid response times
for these questions are a reflection of ease in making
these inferences; rather, it seems to be more indicative
of a general willingness to embellish the story in ways
not clearly determined by the text. Seven-year olds show
a clear progression from the rapid response time to
logical inference questions to a much slower response time
with constrained inference questions, and still slower
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response times to unconstrained inference questions. This
response time pattern is ordered in a fashion reflecting
the inference taxonomy and the "relevancy hypothesis"
suggested by Trabasso and his colleagues (Warren, et al.,
1979). Both of these notions point out that those
inferences which are most important to the developing
story line are most likely to be made. As the inferencing
requirements move further from elements dictated by the
story, or from self-imposed inferencing strategies,
information is increasingly difficult to integrate.
The present study has pointed to a number of specific
components of story materials and emphasized their
importance to the comprehension process. A great deal of
the data presented here argue for the necessity of
employing some concept such as coherence (Trabasso, Secco,
& van der Broek, 1983) for understanding the role of text
material in providing the reader (listener) a clear text
representation. Trabasso, and Omanson, among others, have
argued that the attempt to understand an event is an
attempt to discover the causes of the event and the events
that result from it. This process leads to an experience
of a sequence of events which allows for the development
of a cohesive representation. Trabasso suggests that
networks of causal fields are likely to be established and
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allow for the development of context, and to serve as the
basis for developing story events. The description of
causality connections within story development which
Trabasso provides is a logical outgrowth of his earlier
emphasis on the event chain model, and his attempt to
describe the role of inferences in story comprehension.
Importantly, at this point, Trabasso has also attempted
to reconcile this approach with the more global
description provided by story grammars. Story grammars
have, as has been discussed earlier, led to some fairly
robust findings with respect to order and likelihood of
recall. Trabasso has attempted to illustrate the findings
of story grammar analyses by examining the relative amount
of causal connections which are included in each of the
categorical divisions suggested in the story grammar
analyses. In general, he finds a great deal of overlap in
the grammatical and the causality characterizations, but
argues that process factors will emerge only when a causal
analysis is examined. The emphasis of the story grammar
approach has never really been on causal connections
between events, however, and whenever any allusion to
causal chains has been made, a linear unfolding of events
has been stressed. A major message from both Trabasso's
work and the present study is that the story grammar
approach is limited in ability to analyze processing
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factors in story comprehension.
A further perspective is provided by Barthes (1977)
who reminds us of the active, continual, quality of the
search for understanding, suggesting that "meaning
... is
not at the end of the narrative, it runs across it".
Through an experimental test of some elements of the
inference taxonomy, and consideration of issues related to
the event chain model and the use of inference questions,
the present study has clarified some components of the
development of those processes enabling extraction of
information, and connection of separate events in
stories. A number of findings make it obvious that some
meaning is less difficult to cull from a story and to
apply to later story events. Thus, inferences are clearly
easier when strongly driven by logical causality, and even
very young children draw inferences of this type to bridge
the gaps between story events. Selective production of
other inferences, limited to those mandated by the story
constraints, is a much later developing ability, however,
far from complete at the age of the older children
included in this study. Inferences that are superfluous
or irrelevant are no longer as readily elicited, however,
indicating partial refinement of this skill.
All attempts to study story comprehension, including
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the story grammars, the scriptal based conceptualizations,
and those based on causal connections, start with the
assumption that story events are interconnected in some
fashion. This study makes it apparent that the nature of
these interconnections may be very complex, and very
different in character at different stages of development.
REFERENCES
Barthes, R. Image, Music, IfiJLt. New York, N.Y.: Hill
and Wang, 1977.
Bower, G.H., Black, J.B., & Turner, T.J. Scripts in
memory for text. Cognitive Psychology
, 1979, jj^
177-220.
Frederiksen, C.H. Structure and process in discourse
production and comprehension. in M.A. Just, & P. A.
Carpenter (Eds.), Cognitive Processes in
Comprehension. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1977.
Glasburg, R. & Aboud, F. Keeping one's distance from
sadness: Children's self-reports of emotional
experience. Developmental Psychology
,
1982, 1£, 287-
293.
Goetz, E.T. Inferring from text: Some factors
influencing which inferences will be made. Discourse
P r ocesse s , 1979, 2, 179-195.
Graesser, A.C. Prose Comprehension Beyond iiie. Word .
New York, N.Y. : Spr inger-Verlag, 1981.
Graesser, A.C, Robertson, S.P., & Anderson, P. A.
Incorporating inferences in narrative
representations: A study of how and why. Cognitive
Psychology
. 1981, 11, 1-26.
Graesser, A.C, Robertson, S.P., Lovelace, E.R., &
72
73
Swinehart, D.M. Answers to why- questions expose the
organization of story plot and predict recall of
actions. Journa l QL Verbal Learning and Verbal
Behavior, 1980, l£, no-119.
Hildyard, A. Children's production of inferences from
oral texts. Discourse Processes
, 1979, 2, 33-56.
Hildyard, A. & Olson, D.R. Memory and inference in the
comprehension of oral and written discourse.
Discourse Processes, 1978, l, 91-117.
Johnson, N.S., & Mandler, J.M. A tale of two structures:
Underlyling and surface forms in stories. Poetics
r
1980, 2, 51-86.
Just, M.A., & Carpenter, P. A. A theory of reading: From
eye fixations to comprehension. Psychological Review
,
1980, £2, 329-354.
Kemper, S. Filling in the missing links. Journal of
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior
, 1982, 21, 99-
107.
Kintsch, W. On comprehending stories. In M.A. Just &
P. A. Carpenter (Eds.), Cognitive Processes in
Comprehension
.
Hillsdale, N.J. : Erlbaum, 1977.
Kintsch, W. Learning from text, levels of comprehension:
Why would anyone read a story anyway, Poetics . 1980,
2, 87-98.
74
Kintsch, w., & van Dijk, T.A. Toward a model of text
comprehension and production. Psvchom^^i Rev i Pw .
1978, 363-394.
Lehnert, w. Human and computational question answering.
Cognitive Science, 1977, 1, 47-73.
Mandler, J.M. A code in the node: The use of a story
schema in retrieval. Discoursp Proces^^ 1973, 1,
14-35.
Mandler, J.M. & DeForest, M.A. Is there more than one way
to tell a story? QhilA Development 1979, 5_, 86-89.
Mandler, J.M. & Johnson, N.S. Remembrance of things
parsed: Story structure and recall. Cognitive
Psychology, 1977, £, 111-151.
McCartney, K.A., & Nelson, K. Children's use of scripts
in story recall. Discourse Processes
, 1981, A, 59-
70.
McClure, E., Mason, J., & Barnitz, J. An exploratory
study of story structure and age effects on
children's ability to sequence stories. Discourse
Processes
, 1979, ;2, 213-249.
McKoon, G., & Ratcliff, R. The comprehension process and
memory structures involved in anaphoric reference.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior , 1980,
11, 668-682.
Nelson, K. Structure and strategy in learning to talk.
75
MOnQqraphs & Society fox E^xch in child
Development, 1971, 42, 717-732.
Nelson, K. How children represent their world in and out
of language. in R.S. Siegler (Ed.), Childrpn's
ThxnKing; Develops? Hillsdale, n.j. : Erlbaum,
1979.
Nelson, K., Fivush, R.
, Hudson, J., & Lucariello, J.
Scripts and the development of memory. To appear in
M.T.H. Chi (Ed.), What is Memory Developmpnt- the
Development of? Contributions to Human Development
Monograph Series, J. A. Meachem (Ed.), Basel,
Switzerland: S. Kroger, A.G., in press, 1982.
Nelson, K.
, & Gruendal, J. Generalized event
representations: Basic building blocks of cognitive
development. In M.A. Lamb, & A.L. Brown (Eds.),
Advances in Developmental Psychology , Volume I.
Hillsdale, N.J. : Erlbaum, 1981.
Nicholas, D.W., & Trabasso, T. Toward a taxonomy of
inferences for story comprehension. In F. Wilkening,
J. Becker, & T. Trabasso (Eds.), Information
Integration by Children . Hillsdale, N.J. : Erlbaum,
1981.
Omanson, R.C. An analysis of narratives: Identifying
central, supportive, and distracting content.
76
Discourse Process, i n press.
Paris, S.G., Lindauer, B.K., & Cox, G.L. The development
of inferential comprehension. Chil d Developmpni-
r
1977, M, 1728-1733.
Paris, S.G., & Upton, L.R. Children's memory for
inferential relationships in prose. CJiild.
Development
, 1976, 41, 660-668.
Poulsen, D., Kintsch, E
. ,
Kintsch, W. , & Premack, D.
Children's comprehension and memory for stories.
Journa l of Experimental Child Psychology
, 1979, 23.,
379-403.
Schank, R.c, & Abelson, R. Scripts, £laj^«. GaaJjb. and
Understanding. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1977.
Schimdt, C.R., & Paris, S.G. Children's use of successive
clues to generate inferences. CJiild. Development r
1983, 5JL, 742-759.
Stein, N.L., & Glenn, C.G. An analysis of story
comprehension in elementary school children. In R.
Freedle (Ed.), New Directions in Discourse
Processing . Volume 2. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1979.
Stein, N.L., & Nezworski, T. The effects of organization
and instructional set on story memory. Discourse
Processes . 1977, 1, 177-193.
Thorndyke, P.W. Cognitive structures in comprehension and
memory of narrative discourse. Cognitive Psychology .
77
1977, 1,77-110.
Trabasso, T.
, & Nicholas, D.W. Memory and inferences in
the comprehension of narratives. in F. Wilkening, J.
Becker, & T. Trabasso (Eds.), Information integration
ky_ Ch ildren
. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1981.
Trabasso, T.
,
Secco, T., & van der Broek, p. Causal
cohesion and story coherence. To appear in H. Mandl,
N.L. Stein, & T . Trabasso (Eds.), Learning and
Comprehension of lejLL. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum,
1983.
Warren, W.H., Nicholas, D.W. , & Trabasso, T. Event chains
and inferences in understanding narratives. in R.
Freedle (Ed.), Directions jji Discourse
Processing, Volume 2. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1979.
Whiteman, M. Children's conceptions of psychological
causality. Child Development
,
1967, la, 143-155.
Wimmer, H. Children's understanding of stories:
Assimilation by a general schema for actions, or
coordination of temporal relations? In F. Wilkening,
J. Becker, & T. Trabasso (Eds.), Information
Integration by Children . Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum,
1981.
APPENDIX A
Stories
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Warm-up story 1
George was a monkey in the zoo.
One day, when the keeper was not looking,George took the key for his cage
and ran away.
Questions;
1. What kind of an animal was George?
2. Where did George live?
3. Why did George take the key?
4. Was the zoo keeper a man or a woman?
Warm-up story 2
Policeman Small is a traffic cop
who tells the cars when to stop and go. (Q-l)
One day, a farm truck went by
and a milk can fell out the back onto the road. (Q-2)They put the can back on the truck. (Q-3)
When they turned around,
they saw two kittens licking the road. (Q-4)
Questions;
1. What does Policeman Small do?
2. What color do you think the truck is?
3. Who do you think put the can back?
4. Why were the kittens licking the road?
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Jennifer
One day Jennifer's parents gave her a dollarbecause she wanted to buy a turtle. (Q-l)But as she was walking to the petstore
she turned a somersault and lost it. (Q-2) (physical
causality version)
she became very excited and lost it (Q-2)(psychological causality version)
she lost it (Q-2) (enablement version)
Jennifer was worried that her parents would be angry with
so she decided to search every bit of the sidewalk. (Q-3)For ten long minutes she looked in all the cracks andgrass. (Q-4)
Finally she found the dollar. (Q-5)
When she got to the store she was told
that the last turtle had been sold just one minute ago.
(Q-6)
Questions fox "Jennifer"
Logical
(Q-2) What made
Jennifer lose
her dollar?
(Q-3) Why would
Jennifer's par-
ents be angry
with her?
Constrained Unconstrained
(Q-l) How old do
think Jennifer is?
(Q-5) Do you think
Jennifer has a
dollar bill or a
dollar in change?
(Q-4)What color
hair do you
think Jenn-
fer has?
(Q-6)Was the
person in the
petstore a man
or a woman?
Premise Questions :
1. What did Jennifer want to buy?
2. Who gave Jennifer the dollar?
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Tom
it disapeared. (Q-2) (enablement version)
Tom knew that the kite was his brother's favorite toy,
so he decided to buy another just like it. (Q-3)
He looked in many stores. (Q-4)
After awhile, he found a new kite. (Q-5)
When he got home, Tom found that his brother had also been
to a store,
and had bought Tom his very own kite. (Q-6)
Questions Iqjl "Tom II
Logical Constrained Unconstrained
(Q-2) What made
the kite dis-
appear?
(Q-l)What time
of year did
do you think
this story
happened?
(Q-4) Was Tom a
tall boy or was
he short?
(Q-3) How did
Tom know that
the kite was
his brother's
favorite?
kite was the
same as the
old kite or
(Q-5)Do you
think the new
(Q-6) What do
think Tom's
brother's name
was?
were they different?
Premise questions :
1. Whose kite did Tom play with?
2. Did the kite fly high?
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Carol
One day Carol's friend asked her if she wanted to learnhow to ice skate. (Q-l) di
But as she was walking to the pond
she started to run down the hill and twisted her
ankle. (Q-2) (physical causality version)
she became very excited and twisted her
ankle. (Q-2) (psychological causality version)
she twisted her ankle. (Q-2) (enablement version)Carol was upset that she would have to miss the ice-
skating
,
and decided to get home as soon as she could. (Q-3)Slowly she limped along the path. (Q-4)
At last she was safely home.(Q-5)
Later that day all of her friends came over
and had cookies and hot chocolate while they sang
songs. (Q-6)
Questions for "Carol"
Logical
(Q-2) What made
Carol twist
her ankle?
(Q-3) Why did
Carol decide
to go home?
Constrained Unconstrained
(Q-l) Does Carol
have ice skates?
(Q-5)Do you think
Carol lives in the
city or in the
country?
(Q-4)Did Carol
have blue eyes
or did she have
brown eyes?
(Q-6) What kind
cookies do you
think Carol
ate?
Premise Questions :
1. What did Carol's friend ask her?
2. Where was Carol going?
APPENDIX B
Picture and Vocabulary Stimuli
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Pictures for "Jennifer
"
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Pictures for "Tom"
Pictures for "Carol"
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giraffe
money
anger
excitement

